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Abstract 
This non-technical ‘think-piece’ examines aspects of infrastructure project evaluation, 
concentrating on circumstances that may render a standard cost benefit analysis (CBA) 
inappropriate. It is designed to make infrastructure investors and planners think deeply about 
their assumptions and to broaden the range of issues that are taken into account. Issues 
considered include: the role of CBA; network effects (increasing returns to scale) and the 
endogeneity of resources within an economy; the valuation of productive versus consumptive 
benefits; the value of traded versus non-traded sector production;  the role and choice of the 
discount rate; and the importance of considering option values when making infrastructure 
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Executive Summary 
This non-technical ‘think-piece’ examines aspects of infrastructure project evaluation, 
concentrating on circumstances that may render a standard cost benefit analysis (CBA) 
inappropriate. It is designed to make infrastructure investors and planners think deeply about 
their assumptions and, in some circumstances, to broaden the range of issues that are taken into 
account. Key findings of the paper can be summarised as follows: 
•  CBA is a useful tool for making comparisons between alternative projects designed to 
produce similar benefits. It makes explicit the nature, size and timing of a project’s costs 
and benefits, covering both tangible and intangible items plus wider economic benefits 
(e.g. agglomeration externalities).  
•  A CBA makes an explicit trade-off between present and future net benefits through its 
choice of discount rate. There is no single “correct” discount rate that covers all project 
types. 
•  Where returns from a project can be reinvested at the same rate and risk profile as the 
project under consideration, and where the project could be undertaken equally by 
another agent, a cost of capital (incorporating a market-derived risk premium) constitutes 
an appropriate discount rate for the project. 
•  Even here, the choice of risk premium is far from trivial, and circumstances exist where a 
negative risk premium may be appropriate. 
•  Where the benefit stream in part comprises intangible consumption benefits, the cost of 
capital is generally no longer the appropriate discount rate; inter-personal value 
judgements arise between benefits for current versus future agents. An 8% p.a. real 
discount rate (New Zealand Treasury’s current standard rate) means that, for the same 
tax flows and liability structure, policy-makers prefer to have one unit of consumption 
benefit now in place of six units of benefit in 25 years time.  
•  A conventional CBA is inappropriate where an initial project within a sequence of 
projects creates options for investment in future projects with uncertain returns, and 
where: (a) information about those returns is forthcoming only after the initial project is 
completed, or (b) potential returns from the future projects diminish over time.  
•  In these cases, investment in the initial project creates an option to reap high returns 
through prospective future investments, without imposing an obligation to invest in 
those projects where circumstances indicate that returns will instead be low.  
•  The prospective investment opportunities include those that may be undertaken by 
future agents (e.g. new migrants, start-up firms or international firms not yet present in 
the country) as well as by the initial infrastructure provider or other current agents. 
•  Investment in the initial project may be optimal even when the initial project and the 
combined set of projects both have a negative net present expected value. 
•  The importance of options created by some infrastructure investments means that a 
standard needs analysis may, on occasions, need to be supplemented by an 
“opportunities analysis”. 2 
 
•  A corollary of the options approach is that disinvestment decisions must account for 
future opportunities that may be lost if existing infrastructure were scrapped.  
•  Network effects are a potential source of discontinuity and/or increasing returns to scale 
arising from infrastructure investments; a suite of complementary investments can 
produce greater returns than the sum of returns to each individual investment.  
•  A coordinated approach to infrastructure investment is therefore sometimes required. 
Coordination may be required for diverse investments at a spatial level (e.g. a spatial 
plan) or may relate to several investments of the same type (e.g. road networks) or to 
complementary investments (e.g. investments in fibre plus IT skills).   
•  Infrastructure that raises New Zealand’s productive potential will attract labour and 
capital to the country; one region’s gain should not, in general, be considered another’s 
loss. 
•  Some classes of infrastructure investment have favourable long-term economic effects 
relative to others. Infrastructure that produces returns for the internationally traded 
productive sector delivers greater long-term national benefit than does a project with 
commensurate immediate benefit related to domestic consumption. 
•  Accordingly, a national infrastructure strategy may concentrate on prioritising projects 
that: (i) service the internationally traded productive sector; (ii) exhibit network 
complementarities; and/or (iii) create new opportunities for value-enhancing investments 
that take advantage of the initial investment project.  
•  These considerations, which are largely absent from a conventional CBA evaluation, may 
be combined with the choice of a lower discount rate in order to prioritise projects that 
boost the productive base of the New Zealand economy for a future generation. 
   3 
 
1. Introduction 
Infrastructure investment is an important contributor to economic growth (OECD 2006, 
2007 and 2008; Nijkamp & Poot 2004). Investments in infrastructure are generally characterised 
by large capital items that can be accessed by multiple users, for prolonged time periods. In many 
instances, large-scale long-lived infrastructure projects are provided and/or funded by (central or 
local) government (e.g. roads), although some items (e.g. cell-phone towers) are provided 
privately. 
Our concentration is on how a government body should approach the prospective 
evaluation of a major infrastructure investment. While many New Zealand government agencies 
are involved in some form of infrastructure, it is the Treasury that acts as the “guardian” of the 
evaluation process. Its Cost Benefit Analysis Primer (New Zealand Treasury, 2005) provides a 
succinct and clear introduction to the methods it regards as appropriate for such prospective 
project evaluation.
1
For many (especially small-scale) projects, the methods discussed within the Primer are 
excellent tools to use when analysing whether a project should proceed or not. In some cases, 
however, advances in economic theory - and in other cases, unresolved puzzles - make the 
application of the Treasury’s preferred methods less clear-cut. This paper analyses some of these 
complications. It does so in a context where for two decades, New Zealand had low levels of 
infrastructure investment relative both to its own history and to investment rates in other 
advanced countries (Grimes, 2009a); this situation is only now being rectified (New Zealand 
Government, 2010). 
 The Primer emphasises the benefits of Net Present Value (NPV) analysis and 
Benefit Cost Ratios (BCRs) as tools to evaluate prospective investments within a cost benefit 
analysis (CBA). 
The issues analysed here have implications both for the overall quantum of infrastructure 
investment and for the nature of chosen investments given an investment funding envelope. 
Different methods give different rankings for alternative projects, and the optimal timing of 
investments may differ across approaches. We make no claim that one approach is necessarily 
better than another. Rather, the purpose of the paper is to elucidate the complexity of some of 
the issues at hand and to encourage a deep scrutiny of the assumptions used when evaluating 
major infrastructure investment proposals. 
                                                 
1 NZTA (2010) provides a much more substantial manual targeted at CBAs of transport projects. See also 
Infrastructure Australia (2009) and HM Treasury (2010). 4 
 
The next section of the paper outlines a simple baseline case that we use as our departure 
point in subsequent analytical sections. The baseline case follows the preferred methodology 
used in the Treasury’s Primer in relation to NPV and BCR analyses. Each subsequent section 
analyses a particular departure from the baseline assumptions. Section 3 examines the treatment 
of seemingly unrelated projects that, if conducted together, would create an increasing returns to 
scale network (examples may be a broadband network or conversion of multiple inter-city roads 
into a national highway). The section also examines the endogeneity of resources to the domestic 
economy. Section 4 examines how uncertainty with regard to benefits affects the analysis, raising 
the need to treat option values explicitly within an appraisal. As we will see, this may reduce or 
increase the propensity to invest in certain types of infrastructure. Section 5 examines the 
treatment of productive versus consumption benefits, where the latter are assumed to be 
intangible and incapable of storage. Unlike the standard treatment, this case implies favouring 
some types of benefits over others. In section 6 we examine the rationale behind the use of 
alternative measures of the discount rate and the sensitivity of outcomes to discount rates. All 
these sections involve some use of simple intertemporal economic theory and/or simple 
examples. Section 7, which examines the treatment of infrastructure investments that service 
traded versus non-traded productive sectors, differs in method by utilising a recent model 
(Grimes, 2009) designed to analyse the relative importance of these two sectors at a 
macroeconomic level. 
Conclusions are stated in section 8. These conclusions are not designed to propose a 
single optimal analytical method to be used in place of the Treasury’s Primer. Instead, they 
summarise key issues that complicate the use of any single method, and alert the reader to cases 
where more complex analytical tools or insights are required in order to reach more nuanced, 
and hopefully more appropriate, infrastructure investment decisions. 
2. Standard NPV and BCR Approaches 
After specifying the nature of the economic problem to be addressed and outlining the 
range of potential measures, the most basic approach when conducting a cost benefit analysis 
(CBA) of a potential long-lived project is to:  
a)  calculate all anticipated costs associated with the project, allocating them to specific years;  
b)  calculate all anticipated benefits associated with the project, allocating them to specific 
years;  5 
 
c)  discount each year’s costs and benefits by an appropriate discount factor (that embodies 
the chosen discount rate which in turn reflects the risk of the project
2
d)  sum all discounted benefits less discounted costs to give the project’s net present value 
(NPV); and/or  
);  
e)  take the ratio of the sum of the project’s discounted benefits to discounted costs to give 
the project’s benefit-cost-ratio (BCR);  
f)  if funds are available (i.e. in the absence of non-price rationing) approve the project if 
NPV>0 or, equivalently, if BCR>1; if multiple solutions to the same issue are being 
considered, then choose the project with the highest BCR. 
An important distinction is made in the Primer between ‘financial analysis’ and ‘economic 
cost benefit analysis’. CBA considers all (tangible and intangible) benefits and costs accruing to 
agents within the economy no matter whether they are public or private; benefits and costs are 
therefore not limited just to those relating to the specific agency undertaking the project. By 
contrast, financial analysis considers only costs and benefits as they accrue to the relevant agency. 
For instance, CBA includes the benefits accruing to private car users arising from a new road 
whereas these benefits are not included in a financial analysis (other than, perhaps, through the 
extra excise taxes raised on the petrol used by additional traffic). CBA therefore provides the 
appropriate approach for including all economic benefits when considering a major 
infrastructure project.  
An important corollary is that comparable CBAs must be used when evaluating 
potentially competing projects. For instance, the same categories (and valuations) of intangible 
benefit included in a roading CBA must also be included in a rail CBA; otherwise one transport 
mode may be privileged over another leading to a sub-optimal allocation of investment 
resources. A key implication of this insight is that the rail agency’s accountability should be based 
on the identical approach to the accountability used for the roading agency, rather than being 
assessed in standard financial terms. 
In CBA calculations (and for the purposes of this paper), all costs and benefits are 
calculated in real (i.e. CPI-adjusted) terms. Correspondingly, the discount rate is specified in real 
terms (i.e. the real discount rate is approximately equal to the nominal discount rate less the CPI 
inflation rate). The Primer sets a standard discount rate of 10% real p.a., but this standard rate has 
since been reduced to 8% (New Zealand Treasury, 2008). The Primer notes other possible 
specific rates and indicates that sensitivity analysis of projects should be carried out using 
different discount rates. Except where the discount rate is being analysed, the treatment in this 
paper adopts the standard 8% rate.  
                                                 
2 Note that risk should be in terms of the ‘beta’ of the project (i.e. its correlation with the market portfolio) rather 
than its volatility (standard deviation). 6 
 
The period of analysis is taken to correspond to the economic lifetime of the project (or 
assets) being considered, although a shorter time-span with consideration of residual value, or a 
longer time-span incorporating sequential projects could be considered in equivalent fashion. 
The Primer (p.13) advises that given its standard discount rate “the recommended approach is to 
use an analysis period of 20 years, because impacts beyond 20 years tend to be insignificant after 
the time value of money (discounting) is taken into account.” 
In addition, the Primer states (p.10): “Ideally CBA will demonstrate that the expected 
benefits of a given proposal exceed the expected costs. That is, to determine if there is a net 
benefit. If the net benefit is greater than zero then the proposal may be worthwhile pursuing.” As 
we demonstrate later in this paper, the decision criterion may, however, be more complicated 
than giving the go-ahead (respectively, putting a stop) to a proposal that has positive 
(respectively, negative) net benefit. Indeed, the Primer indicates a number of items that may 
complicate the analysis, including: 
a)  difficulties in assigning values to certain (intangible) benefits, while noting that 
intangibles should be explicitly included where they can be reliably measured (or at least 
be itemised and included qualitatively); 
b)  difficulties in assessing the “strategic value” of a project (although this term is not 
defined); 
c)  the risk of ‘optimism’ bias – i.e. understating costs and/or over-stating benefits 
(however, other research suggests that, in some situations, there may be an opposite 
tendency to understate potential benefits)
3
d)  the ability to “provide assurance” that “all significant benefits and costs … will be 
realised” (p.10), while also including contingencies (p.17); 
; 
e)  the need to include deadweight losses due to taxation,
4
The Primer makes the standard assumption (for a long-lived project) that all resources in 
the economy are otherwise fully utilised. The potential for large-scale investments to influence 
the available pool of resources (e.g. by affecting international migration flows and/or 
international capital investments) is not addressed. Such increases in resources available to the 
economy raise economic activity. Similarly, existing resources may be used more effectively as a 
 although no distinction is made in 
the Primer between investments that are funded by taxation relative to those funded by 
users (the latter case does not incur the deadweight loss associated with taxation). 
                                                 
3 For example, see Grimes (2009a) and Grimes and Liang (2010). 
4 The Primer (p.18) recommends multiplying public expenditures by 1.2 prior to discounting to incorporate 
deadweight loss effects (in addition to using its recommended discount rate; thus indicating that the discount rate is 
not set so as to include deadweight loss impacts). 7 
 
result of infrastructure investments that produce agglomeration externalities or other forms of 
increasing returns to scale in the economy.
5
Ignoring the complications discussed above, we begin with a baseline CBA for a notional 
long-term (101 year) project and adopt the basic CBA methodology. The key parameters of this 
baseline project, deliberately chosen to highlight some of the complexities examined in this 
paper, are shown in Table 1. 
 
The project outlined in the table has an initial five years of known capital costs and, for 
simplicity, requires no subsequent outlays. Benefits do not begin to accrue until 5 years after the 
commencement of the project, and then accrue at a constant (undiscounted) known rate for 96 
years; no benefits accrue thereafter. While the accrued benefits are over nine times the accrued 
costs, once discounting occurs the project only just has a positive NPV (BCR≈1). Hence the 
judgement that follows from this baseline CBA is that society is virtually indifferent to whether 
this project should proceed or not.   
Table 1: Baseline Project* 
Year  Costs ($million)  Benefits ($million) 
0  100  0 
1  100  0 
2  100  0 
3  100  0 
4  100  0 
5  0  47 
6  0  47 
7  0  47 
…  …  … 
100  0  47 
101 …  0  0 
SUM (Undiscounted)  500  4,512 
SUM (Discounted at 8% p.a.)  431  432 
NPV     0.4       (≈ 432 - 431) 
BCR  1.0008  (≈ 432/431) 
* All numbers in this and subsequent tables are in real terms; figures are rounded to the nearest whole number 
unless confusion would otherwise arise. 
 
Subsequent sections vary key parameters within this model to show how the reasoning 
that lies behind the parameters can significantly alter the outcomes. 
                                                 
5 The box on pp.13-14 of the Primer discussing benefits typically considered for roading proposals includes no such 
benefits; however, NZTA (2010) does now incorporate wider economic benefits of these types.  8 
 
3. Network Benefits and Resource Availability 
3.1.  Network Effects 
In many cases, infrastructure projects are considered in the context of the existing 
environment with allowance made for likely developments. The latter may include regional 
demographic developments based, for instance, on Statistics New Zealand’s medium population 
projections for affected regions.
6
Increasing returns may occur through at least two mechanisms. The first is through 
network effects that occur by virtue of a series of linked projects of the same type. Examples 
may include a telecommunications network in which the effectiveness of a single 
telecommunications device is magnified by other users joining the network, or a roading network 
in which firm or household location decisions may be dependent on a fast road being available 
for the full distance between two locations rather than a series of fast and slow patches of road 
between those locations. 
 However it is unusual, at least in New Zealand practice, to 
undertake a CBA of multiple seemingly-unrelated projects that together exhibit increasing 
returns to scale.  
A second situation in which there may be increasing returns is where complementary 
investments (of different types) are made in a specific area. Local “master-planning” for large-
scale urban extensions exemplify the issues. A new settlement requires multiple types of 
infrastructure – roads, public transport networks, telecommunications, electricity supplies, water 
supply, sewerage, schools, health services, community facilities, etc. If any one of these 
infrastructures is lacking, the entire project may be rendered infeasible or lose significant value, 
but each investment project can only be evaluated in the context of all others also taking place. 
For instance, if the existing population of the locality is 100, none of these infrastructure 
investments may be worthwhile, but if the population is expected to increase to 10,000 as a result 
of a coordinated master-plan development, all services may not only be feasible, but also 
necessary for the development to occur. Analysis of a specific infrastructure project in isolation 
of all others would, in this case, be inappropriate. 
We illustrate the issues with an example exhibiting the former type of increasing returns, 
but the analysis applies just as readily to the latter type. Consider ten potential roading 
investments, each a fifth the size of our baseline case (i.e. with expenditures of $20 million p.a. 
                                                 
6 In the next sub-section, we examine cases where the resources (including population) of the region may be affected 
by the infrastructure investment decision, thereby rendering inappropriate the use of a standard projection that does 
not incorporate the prospective investment. 9 
 
for years 0-4). Five of the projects are scattered around the country and have a benefit profile 
exactly one-fifth that of the baseline project (i.e. $9.4 million p.a. for years 5-100). Together, 
these five projects equate to the baseline case and so all would be undertaken on the same basis 
as for the baseline case in Table 1. 
The other five projects each involve upgrading a separate portion of a local road between 
two cities to motorway standard. Considered by itself (i.e. in the absence of the other four 
upgrades) the benefit profile for each project is $9 million p.a. for years 5-100. As shown in the 
first Benefit column of Table 2, each of these projects - considered as specific isolated projects - 
would be uneconomic with a negative NPV and a BCR of less than one.  
Table 2:  Network Effects of Five Related Projects 
Year  Sum of Costs 
($million) 
Sum of Benefits: 
Project-specific 
($million) 
Sum of Benefits: 
Network 
($million) 
0  100  0  0 
1  100  0  0 
2  100  0  0 
3  100  0  0 
4  100  0  0 
5  0  45  50 
6  0  45  50 
7  0  45  50 
…  …  …  … 
100  0  45  50 
101 …  0  0  0 
SUM 
(Undiscounted) 
500  4,320  4,800 
SUM (Discounted)  431  413  459 
NPV    -18  28 
BCR    0.9582  1.0647 
 
Now consider the case where all five projects were treated as a single project and built 
together. The cost profile of all five projects remains as before but the total benefit is now $50 
million p.a. (for years 5-100), i.e. 11.1% higher than the total benefits if considered as five 
isolated projects. The final column of Table 2 summarises the outcomes, revealing that the 
combined project would now not only be undertaken (since the NPV is positive) but also be 
undertaken in preference to the baseline projects (the BCR for the linked motorway project of 
1.0647 exceeds that of the baseline case). The latter situation may be relevant where investment 
funds or contracting resources are limited.  10 
 
The example illustrated above may appear to be either contrived (where do the extra 
benefits arise from?) or obvious (who could object to considering the network impacts of the 
projects?). Let us take these two points in turn. 
Network effects are quite obvious in the master-plan example discussed above. A new 
settlement without a specific key piece of infrastructure (for instance, a school or an electricity 
supply) may fail, whereas it would be highly successful if all relevant infrastructure elements are 
built. Consideration of each element by itself (i.e. ignoring the concurrent placement of other 
infrastructures) could lead to a decision to build none of the infrastructures rather than the 
optimal decision to build all. 
At the larger regional level, the move towards a regional spatial plan for Auckland 
(incorporating the regional infrastructure investment plan), as part of the formation of the 
Auckland Council, reflects a need to consider interactions between separate infrastructure 
investments. For instance, CBD development plans cannot be adequately considered without 
consideration also of public and private transport links from outer suburbs to the CBD (both for 
workplace location and for entertainment/shopping choices): CBD development may fail if 
transport links from the rest of the urban area to the CBD are poor. Conversely, projected 
benefits of transport upgrades may not be sufficiently high for a project to proceed unless CBD 
upgrades (e.g. to the harbour-front) also occur, in which case the network benefits may exceed 
the sum of benefits attributed to each of the projects. 
The importance of long-term infrastructure planning incorporating network effects has 
long been recognised within the development economics literature.
7
                                                 
7 Lakshmanan (2010) cites the contributions of Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) and Hirschman (1958) that stress the 
importance of coordinated investments where opportunities are available to invest in increasing returns to scale 
technologies and where investment in a single project is unprofitable. 
 Recently, the Secretary of 
the Australian Treasury, Ken Henry (2010), has followed this line of argument noting that an 
important element for government to consider is “the need for infrastructure investment to take 
place in carefully designed and planned networks … Government has an important role to play 
in enabling planning and providing a coordination and organising function” (p.15). He notes the 
importance of metropolitan level planning and development functions, citing international 
examples and the advent of Australia’s Capital City Strategic Plans which provide a way “to 
facilitate cooperation between tiers of government.” By contrast, New Zealand’s National 
Infrastructure Plan (New Zealand Government, 2010) places less emphasis on strategic planning or 
on consideration of network effects. 11 
 
3.2.  Resource Availability 
At the national level, almost no spatial planning (or even coordination) is undertaken 
explicitly, despite New Zealand being smaller in population than moderate sized international 
cities. One reason for eschewing such an approach at the national level – apart from the major 
information and coordination problems – is that, for some types of investment, one region’s gain 
may be offset by another region’s loss (e.g. a new stadium may shift test matches from one city 
to another but not increase the overall number of test matches played in New Zealand).  
This raises an important issue regarding the relationship between investment in new 
projects, especially those exhibiting increasing returns to scale, and the endogeneity of resource 
supply within the economy. Many firm and household location decisions are made in an 
international context; for New Zealand, the trans-Tasman context is particularly important. A 
spatial equilibrium approach (Roback, 1982; Haughwout, 2002; Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2009) 
indicates that resources (including people) flow across regional and national boundaries so as to 
equalise returns from producing and living in different regions. Land prices and wages adjust to 
equate returns after consideration of amenity and productivity values associated with certain 
locations and their infrastructures. 
Consider a hypothetical case where a firm wishes to establish a facility close to a major 
university that has strong agri-tech capability and is near a major international airport. It can 
locate in Sydney, employ 100 people at an average salary of $100,000 per person
8
Within New Zealand, the same firm could locate either in Hamilton (close to agri-tech 
research facilities) or Auckland (close to an international airport) but, based on current 
infrastructure, it cannot locate close to both facilities. Its definition of “being close to an airport” 
may include uninterrupted motorway access from (near) the research facility to the airport (with 
an additional maximum journey time constraint, which we assume is met were there to be a 
motorway link between Hamilton and Auckland).  
 and make an 
annual profit of $10,000,000; thus total value added is $20,000,000 p.a. We assume that 25% of 
each of salaries and profits (i.e. $5,000,000 p.a.) is paid to government in tax, leaving $7,500,000 
for employees and the same amount for owners of capital.  
Without a motorway link, the facility will be located in Sydney and some portion of the 
100 employees will migrate from New Zealand to Sydney to work in the facility (either directly to 
access specific jobs or indirectly as job opportunities in Sydney are seen to be superior to 
Auckland/Hamilton). Their existing salaries will be lost to the local community, and – in 
                                                 
8 All sums are in New Zealand dollars for simplicity. 12 
 
particular – the New Zealand government’s tax revenues will decrease in line with the lost 
incomes. By contrast, the firm (and others like it) may locate the facility in Hamilton if the 
motorway link is built, thereby providing a step jump in returns provided the full roading 
upgrade is completed.  
Importantly, since the choice is between locating the facility in Sydney versus 
Hamilton/Auckland, there is no case for arguing that the gain to Auckland/Hamilton is at the 
expense of another region in New Zealand. Instead, the quantity of resources available to New 
Zealand – including the $5 million to the New Zealand government through additional tax 
revenue – is increased by virtue of the new motorway link. In other words, the link results not 
just in a productivity improvement relating to existing resources, but also in additional resources 
being made available to both the private and public sectors. 
The example given above is not restricted to the case of network effects – it could also 
arise in the case of an individual project. However, from an international firm’s viewpoint, a 
coordinated set of infrastructure investments that lifts the capability of a particular region 
provides both an explicit signal and a concrete inducement to invest in New Zealand rather than 
in Australia or elsewhere. Again, the master-plan example provides the intuition: a resident or 
commercial enterprise is more likely to locate in a new settlement where it is apparent that 
coordinated services are available than in one where there is no apparent coordination of 
multiple services. 
The endogeneity of resource location (i.e. the ability of resources to migrate across spatial 
boundaries) in response to a set of infrastructure investments has another corollary: it provides a 
counter-example to the standard treatment of deadweight costs associated with tax-financed 
infrastructure investments. Traditionally, it has been argued that the deadweight costs associated 
with taxation should be added to the cost side of a CBA. In the example above, however, 
because resources are internationally mobile, the pool of tax revenues available to government 
can increase as a result of a tax-financed investment, thus enabling a marginal reduction in tax 
rates (and hence in deadweight costs or ‘excess burdens’). The potential for an increase in tax 
revenues and/or a decrease in tax rates therefore also needs to be incorporated into a CBA. 
4. Uncertainty and Options 
4.1.  Options Overview 
Most projects involve an inherently uncertain stream of benefits; costs may also be 
uncertain although they are generally more certain than the benefit steam. Henceforth we 13 
 
concentrate on issues of benefit uncertainty, though the same insights apply equally to cost 
uncertainties.  
The Treasury’s Primer (p.10) recommends that analyses are able to provide assurance that 
all significant benefits and costs will be realised. This approach implies that uncertain benefits 
should not be included in the CBA or, perhaps, should have some discount applied to their 
expected value prior to incorporation in the analysis (an approach that also mitigates the 
potential for optimism bias). Contingency scenarios with alternative outcomes for the benefit 
streams can also be used.  
Laird et al (2009) note that option values have hitherto been largely absent as a 
component of transport appraisals. Building on the environmental literature they define option 
value in a transport sense as: “the willingness-to-pay to preserve the option of using a transport 
service for trips not yet anticipated or currently undertaken by other modes over and above the 
expected value of any such future use.”
9
The modern approach to investment under uncertainty (e.g. Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) 
provides some rigour for conceptualising the nature of option values. Instead of treating benefits 
in an expected value sense or discounting benefits to reflect their uncertainty as in standard CBA 
approaches, the modern approach treats the inherent uncertainties explicitly within a “real 
options” framework that builds on the financial options approach of Black and Scholes (1974). 
This framework takes into account the option value involved in the timing of investment 
decisions. In some cases, delay has positive option value whereas, in others, investing early 
creates option value. We provide examples demonstrating how consideration of option values 
can change the timing and outcomes of decisions with regard to infrastructure investment. 
 In this sense, the option value is equivalent to a risk 
premium that an individual would pay to ensure that a service is provided. They find that the few 
rail appraisal studies that have included option values exhibit a pattern: option values are typically 
highest for rail lines where current user benefits (and patronage) are low and/or where 
commuting opportunities (e.g. opening/closing stations) are concerned. 
4.2.  Baseline Variants 
Consider our baseline case with one variation. Instead of having a certain stream of 
benefits of 47 from year 5 onwards, we now have a certain stream of benefits of 30 p.a. plus an 
uncertain stream of benefits of 34 p.a. (also starting in year 5). The probability of the uncertain 
                                                 
9 Note that this concept of an option differs, at least in nuance, from the meaning in the project appraisal 
literature where the appraiser may evaluate a range of options (i.e. alternatives) for the same project. 14 
 
stream of benefits being realised is ‘p’ with probability 1-p that that stream will not occur (i.e. will 
be zero).  
If p=0.5, the expected stream of benefits at the start of the project is 47 (=30+0.5x34) 
which is identical (in expected value terms) to the benefit stream in the baseline case. If one were 
to follow a pure expected value approach to the CBA, the decision to undertake the project 
would therefore be identical to that in the baseline case. Any p>0.5 would result in the project 
proceeding (if funding is fully available at the baseline discount rate); any lower p would result in 
rejection of the project. 
If one were to apply any discount to the uncertain returns (since one cannot “provide 
assurance” that “all significant benefits and costs … will be realised”), the project’s NPV would 
become negative and the project would not proceed even with p=0.5. In this case, i.e. if there 
were an aversion to treating the uncertain returns in an expected value framework, p may have to 
be very much higher than 0.5 in order for the project to proceed.
10
Now consider what the optimal investment decision would be if it was known at time t 
that the uncertainty surrounding project returns would be completely resolved in year 1 (i.e. one 
year later). There are now two alternatives: (1) invest, as before, in year zero; or (2) wait until year 




If the project planner were to wait until year 1 and then make a decision on the project in 
light of the new information on benefits (i.e. whether they will be 64 p.a. (=30+34) or 30 p.a.), 
the effects of uncertainty are removed, but time will be lost in accruing the benefits of the 
project in the case where the project is beneficial. The discounted stream of net benefits will 
therefore be reduced (as viewed from year 0).  
 The expected net present value for alternative (1), with p=0.5 is fractionally positive, 
as shown in Table 1. The middle column of Table 3 shows the NPV for varying values of p if 
the project is begun in year 0. 
In year 1, the project will only be undertaken if the uncertain stream of benefits 
materialises. In this case, the stream of benefits exceeds the baseline level, and we know from the 
prior analysis that the project should (just) be undertaken given the baseline benefit stream. If 
the stream of benefits does not materialise, the benefits fall well below the baseline level and so 
the project will not be undertaken.  
                                                 
10 Such an approach, if generalised, could result in significant loss of value if a series of unrelated projects with 
uncorrelated returns were rejected owing to a discount being applied to each of their uncertain benefit streams. 
11 In this case, we assume that once the project has been started it will continue as planned for the full period. 
Sequential project investments, with the ability to halt the project part-way through, are examined in the next sub-
section. 15 
 
By waiting until year 1, therefore, the value of the project (viewed from year 0) will equal 
p multiplied by the discounted value of the project in year 1 (if it proceeds) plus 1-p multiplied 
by the discounted value of the project in year 1 (if it does not proceed). The second part of the 
sum is zero since the project will not proceed if the uncertain benefits do not materialise; hence 
the NPV in that case is zero. Thus, by waiting until year 1, the value of the project (as viewed in 
year 0) is d*p*NPV1 where d is the discount factor (which in our example is 0.9259 = 1.08
-1) and 
NPV1 is the project’s NPV as measured in year 1 if the uncertain benefits materialise. Column 3 
of Table 3 indicates the project’s NPV (viewed from year 0) if the decision is delayed to year 1. 
Comparison of columns 2 and 3 shows that an immediate start to the project (in year 0) 
should only proceed if p>0.93, in which case the costs of waiting balance the benefits of 
resolving the uncertainty. In all cases with p<0.93, it is optimal to delay the investment. In these 
circumstances, the result is that the project planner who incorporates option values will take a 
more conservative
Table 3: Options and the Effects of Uncertainty 
 investment stance than does one who operates on the basis of traditional 
CBA frameworks using expected values.   
Probability of  
uncertain benefits  
Expected value if begin 
project in Year 0 
Expected value if decision 
is delayed to Year 1 
P  NPV  NPV 
0.45  -15  65 
0.5  0.4  73 
0.6  32  87 
0.7  63  102 
0.8  94  116 
0.9  125  131 
0.93  135  135 
0.95  141  138 
 
The favouring of a conservative investment stance is a standard result from the 
investment under uncertainty literature. As the length of time until resolution of the uncertainty 
increases (for a given p), the required degree of certainty with regard to the positive outcome that 
is required to delay the project falls, since the cost of delay increases with the number of years 
that the project is delayed.  
A corollary of the conservative investment approach is that, given the same assumptions, 
a conservative disinvestment (i.e. scrapping) policy also applies. For instance, if our example 
applied to an operational but loss-making rail line, a decision-maker would require a higher 
degree of certainty that material future benefits would not arise if the rail line were retained than 
he would under an expected value analysis. In the presence of large sunk costs, an existing loss-16 
 
making line may be retained for a significant period if the magnitude of future demand has 
considerable uncertainty (provided that operating losses are not “too large”). This may occur, for 
instance, in the presence of major uncertainty about future fuel and/or carbon prices. 
Now consider a second case for the resolution of uncertainty. In this case, the 
uncertainty is not resolved until the completion of construction (i.e. end of year 4 if construction 
starts in year 0). In this case, the analysis is identical to the expected value case since the project 
must be evaluated, ex ante, without any ability to resolve the uncertainty until after construction 
has ended. No amount of waiting will help to resolve the uncertainty, and any delay reduces the 
net present value of the project (if expected NPV is positive). Thus, using the benefit flows 
considered above (certain benefits of 30 p.a. and uncertain benefits of 34 p.a., with p=0.5), the 
project should just proceed in year 0 despite the uncertainty.  
An example of this type of uncertainty is where it is difficult to gauge the actual usage of 
a projected infrastructure investment, and the only way of resolving that uncertainty is to build it 
and find out. Some major new roads may fit this category (e.g. the Lane Cove tunnel in Sydney) 
as well as new technologies (e.g. fast broadband based on fibre-optic cable). 
4.3.  Sequential Investment Decisions and Learning 
Previous examples considered investment projects that, once begun, had to be finished 
in their entirety. Some infrastructure projects (e.g. a tunnel) are of this nature, but others can be 
broken down into a sequence of inter-related projects (as discussed in relation to infrastructure 
networks). Furthermore, for some investments, the process of undertaking initial steps reveals 
information about the benefits (or costs) of further stages in the development that cannot 
otherwise be gained. As an example, a pilot fibre broadband roll-out to certain locations may 
help reveal the actual market demand for potential new services. Another example is where a 
‘back-bone’ investment by a public entity (such as the electricity transmission grid) leads to 
private sector investors evaluating the potential pay-offs of future investments (in electricity 
generation and/or electricity usage) that require the back-bone already to be in place. 
Dixit and Pindyck (1994; chapter 10) show that in these circumstances, the initial 
investment steps have information value over and above their direct contribution to the NPV of 
the investment programme. This information value, coupled with the ability to make subsequent 
decisions based on this information, means that part of the value gained from the initial 
investments is equivalent to the purchase of an option to proceed with further investments, and 
that this option has positive value. 17 
 
Use of this real-options framework reveals that value can be created through the 
development and exercise of sequential projects, with option values attached to each successive 
project (Miller and Lessard, 2008). The key requirements for a project to create positive option 
value are: (a) project cash flows are made sequentially; (b) there exists uncertainty or volatility 
concerning the value of a project; and (c) flexibility is retained about whether successive projects 
are undertaken or not, with decisions on those projects reflecting new information that comes to 
hand after completion of earlier projects in the sequence. Under these circumstances, the ex ante 
economic value of a sequence of projects can be greater than the discounted present value of the 
expected future cash flows. The reason is that value is increased through the creation of options 
for subsequent sequential choices through the completion of initial projects.  
We illustrate the nature of these option values through a simple example.  We consider 
an infrastructure programme comprising multiple projects in which each project has its own pay-
off with or without completion of subsequent projects within the programme. Examples may 
include an upgrade to an existing major road route, a sequence of fibre (broadband) investments 
or upgrade of the national transmission grid with the possibility of extra investments either in 
generation facilities or by new electricity users (i.e. extra firms or households) in the region. 
Our illustration adopts a simple three-period model (periods 0, 1, 2) as detailed in Table 
4. The full infrastructure programme comprises two projects: A and B. Project A, built in year 0, 
must be completed prior to project B if project B is to be undertaken. If project B is undertaken, 
it is built in year 1. The investor has the option of undertaking project A only and then deciding 
not to proceed with project B. The cost of each project (discounted to year 0) is $100 million in 
its year of construction.  
If only project A is built, the benefit is known to be $60 million (which accrues in year 2). 
At the outset of the programme, the benefit that may accrue from project B is uncertain. There 
is a probability, p, that it will add nothing over and above project A, and so the overall benefit in 
year 2 would remain at $60 million. With probability, 1-p, the additional benefit from completion 
of project B is $240 million resulting in total benefit of $300 million in year 3. In our examples 
below we adopt p=0.5. 
Consider a standard CBA conducted at the outset of year 0 solely for project A (i.e. 
ignoring project B). The discounted benefit is $60 million, the cost is $100 million, so the 
project’s NPV = -$40 million. The decision stemming from a standard CBA is therefore not to 
proceed with project A by itself. 
 18 
 
Table 4:  Sequential Investment Projects 
  Period 
0  1  2 
All values in $ million 
(discounted to year 0) 
Cost:      Project A  100  0  0 
Cost:      Project B  0  100  0 
Benefit:  Project A (by itself)  0  0  60 
Benefit:  Combined projects (poor outcome)  0  0  60 
Benefit:  Combined projects (good outcome)  0  0  300 
Probability of poor outcome  0.5 
NPV: Project A only (without option value)  -40 
NPV: Combined projects (without option value)  -20 
NPV: Programme (including option value)  30 
 
Now consider a standard CBA conducted at the outset of year 0 for the combined 
programme of project A and project B. The expected discounted benefit is now the average of 
$60 million (if project B adds no value) and $300 million, i.e. $180 million. The total discounted 
cost is $100 million (project A) plus $100 million (project B), i.e. $200 million. Thus the 
combined projects’ NPV = -$20 million. Again, the decision stemming from this CBA is not to 
proceed with the combined projects. Since neither project A not the combined projects yields a 
positive NPV, the overall programme would be declared uneconomic on the basis of a standard 
CBA. 
Now consider how this result changes when the uncertainty about the magnitude of 
benefit resolves itself at the end of year 0. At this stage, the investor can choose whether to 
proceed with project B or not; by that stage, project A is irreversible.  
If, at the end of year 0, it becomes known that the unfavourable outcome will occur (i.e. 
total benefit remains at $60 million) there is no return to undertaking project B and the overall 
programme will be capped at project A – even though project A, considered by itself, is 
uneconomic. (The cost of project A is sunk at this stage so the benefit will still accrue and it is 
not worth scrapping it.) Thus the NPV of the programme is -$40 million as shown earlier for 
project A by itself.  
If, instead, it becomes known at the end of year 0 that the favourable result will occur, 
then project B will be undertaken since the marginal discounted benefits of the project will be 
$240 million compared with the marginal discounted cost of $100 million, an NPV (discounted 
to year 0) for project B (given project A) of $140 million. The NPV for the combined projects is 
now $100 million ($300 million benefits less $200 million costs).  
Knowing that there is a p=0.5 chance of undertaking project B, an investor at the outset 
will calculate the NPV of the combined programme as the average of the two NPVs (i.e.  -$40 19 
 
million and $100 million). The overall NPV for the programme is therefore $30 million. Since 
this value is positive, the programme should be undertaken; i.e. project A, at least, should be 
undertaken. 
How is it that a standard CBA of project A rejects the project, and a standard CBA of 
the two projects combined rejects the joint projects, yet project A, at least, should optimally 
proceed? The key is that by completing project A, the investor is gaining an option to proceed 
with project B, but he does not have that option if project A is never begun. The crucial 
assumption that yields value is that the knowledge about final benefit is crystallised only as a 
result of undertaking project A. Part of the return to completing project A is therefore the value 
of the option to proceed with project B that is created by first investing in project A. 
If we consider real world examples, electricity planners may only learn about potential 
industrial demand for electricity in a region if the capacity to supply that power already exists; 
otherwise electricity-intensive firms will not consider the merits of establishing themselves in that 
region, and so will never communicate their potential regional electricity demand to the 
suppliers. Similarly, if fibre broadband access is not already available in a city, 
telecommunications providers may not know of the potential location choices of international 
firms wishing to situate themselves where high-speed broadband is already available. A roading 
planner may not know of the demand for new subdivisions in areas beyond the current highway 
if reasonable road access is currently unavailable. By creating the raw capacity to deliver 
electricity, information and/or vehicles, these investments can then induce private sector agents 
to reveal their valuations of newly available services, leading to further investments that may be 
undertaken privately (e.g. industrial plants, new firms in high-tech services, etc). 
These examples indicate a further complication that arises with infrastructure investment: 
the initial investor is often (or generally) not the party that accrues the benefits arising from 
subsequent investments. In many case, project A in our illustration is the infrastructure 
investment, while project B is the aggregate of many smaller firm-specific investments, the 
benefits of which accrue to those firms, and/or to local landowners that benefit through an 
increase in their property prices (Grimes and Liang, 2010). The planner of project A does not 
have the information to accurately assess the marginal benefits flowing from project(s) B since 
the latter information is decentralised and may not even be within the knowledge base of existing 
firms. Firms may only develop that knowledge in response to project A’s completion. Yet 
ignoring the potential benefits – even where these benefits are uncertain as in our illustration – 
results in under-investment. In particular, treating potential benefits within an expected value 
framework (as in a conventional CBA) or, even worse, in a risk averse manner, may result in 20 
 
under-investment where the project itself helps to elicit the nature and quantity of benefits that 
may arise. 
4.4.  Additional Option-Related Considerations 
The option value in the previous example arises, in part, because the act of investing in 
the first stage project reveals information about the pay-offs in subsequent stages that would not 
otherwise be revealed. In addition to the examples already cited, research facilities (including 
both public good and private research facilities) are of this nature; commercialisation 
opportunities (i.e. second stage projects) only become apparent once the initial, more basic, 
research has been undertaken.  
Another type of uncertainty is where the potential uncertain benefits may dissipate over 
time (or even disappear entirely if an early-mover advantage is lost). Consider, for instance, 
investment in fibre for fast broadband. If New Zealand were to invest now, it may capture (or at 
least retain) firms that require fast broadband services but if it were to delay the fibre investment, 
these firms may move offshore or fail to become established as the opportunity to be at the 
vanguard of new ventures is lost. In this case, contrary to the more standard situation with 
uncertainty, delay incurs a significant cost (in addition to the cost represented by the discount 
rate). While waiting may resolve uncertainty, the act of waiting in this example diminishes the 
size of the prospective uncertain benefits.
12
Furthermore, there may be a game-theoretic element here. Consider two jurisdictions 
that compete for the opportunity to attract firms requiring fast broadband. Neither jurisdiction 
knows, with certainty, the size of the potential benefits that new fibre will bring, but both have a 
positive NPV for the project. The catch is that only the first investment will capture the benefits 
since firms agglomerate to the location of the early-mover. In this case, it pays to bring forward 
construction as much as possible so as to establish one’s location as the dominant player in the 
field, as opposed to being relegated to a backwater. This situation is another example where the 
infrastructure investment, if undertaken early, effectively includes the purchase of an option with 
positive value. The uncertainty in this situation results in an optimal policy of fast-forwarding 
investment rather than delaying it. 
  
                                                 
12 This result is related to the analysis of the intensive margin versus the extensive margin in the international trade 
literature. For instance, exports of existing firms may increase following a reduction in transport costs (the intensive 
margin) but the magnitude of this effect may be less than the extra exports arising from new firms entering 
exporting as a result of the cost reduction (the extensive margin). See Hummels and Klenow (2005) and Chaney 
(2008) for additional details. 21 
 
Now consider a further type of uncertainty that interacts with the network effects 
discussed in the prior section. Take a project A, that is identical to our baseline case;  from 
analysis of that case we are essentially indifferent as to whether this project proceeds or not 
(BCR=1.0008). Now introduce a project B that like our first variation considered in this section 
has a certain stream of benefits of 30 p.a. plus an uncertain stream of benefits of 34 p.a. The 
probability of the uncertain stream of benefits being realised is p>0.5, and uncertainty for this 
stream cannot be resolved until after construction is completed. From the previous analysis, this 
project should proceed. 
However, the uncertain benefit stream can only be realised if a complementary project 
(project A that has NPV=0) is also undertaken. In this case, while we would be indifferent to 
undertaking project A by itself, proceeding with that project is now the equivalent of purchasing 
an option that has value to capture the expected value of the uncertain benefit stream from 
project B. Project A should therefore also be undertaken since its value needs to reflect the 
positive value of the option that relates to Project B. This conclusion would remain even if the 
conventionally-calculated NPV of Project A were negative but where the option value relating to 
Project B outweighs the negative NPV associated with Project A alone. 
How might such a situation arise in practice? Consider a fibre investment (in this case 
Project A) plus an investment in a technology park attached to a university or research institute 
(Project B). Without the fibre investment, Project B cannot recoup its costs, but with that 
investment it has the potential (with probability p) to capture an uncertain stream of benefits 
from new technology start-up firms. In this case, the investment in Project A is crucial to 
creating the option value relating to project B.  
4.5.  Options Insights 
The analysis in this section demonstrates that uncertainty about future benefit (and cost) 
flows raises major complexities that are not dealt with appropriately by standard CBA 
approaches. In some circumstances, uncertainty leads to a more conservative investment stance 
that results in an optimal decision to delay an investment (relative to the standard CBA 
methodology).  
In other cases, especially where learning may occur within a sequential investment 
process or where there may be international competition for firms to locate around new 
technologies, uncertainty can lead to investments optimally being fast-tracked. In addition, 
complementarities across projects may lead to investment in a project with zero or even negative 22 
 
NPV where investment in that project is essential in order to realise option value associated with 
benefits attached to a separate project.    
5. Production and Consumption Benefits 
Conventional CBA treats all types of benefits symmetrically. For instance, the benefits of 
a new road that reduces congestion for business traffic, so raising value added, is conceptually 
treated the same as a new road that reduces congestion for holiday traffic, so raising the quantity 
or quality of leisure time.
13
The issue addressed in this section is whether equal treatment is appropriate. To focus 
the analysis, we concentrate on cases where the consumption benefit is intangible and non-
storable, but nonetheless demonstrably positive (e.g. hip replacements for the elderly). 
Productive benefits are assumed to be tangible, leading to extra income (for firms or employees) 
that can in turn be reinvested.  
 As another example, conceptually the benefits that people may derive 
from consumption-related uses of a new fibre roll-out (e.g. access to free websites) are treated 
equally to the additions to firms’ value added that may occur as a result of a similar roll-out.  
In order to analyse these issues, we return to our baseline example. The costs of that 
project are $100 million p.a. for 5 years. The assumption lying behind the conventional CBA 
approach is that, instead of investing in that project, the government or other investor could 
alternatively have invested the funds in another investment with the same risk profile and earn 
8%. If it did so, at the start of year 101, the $500 million investment (spread over years 0 to 4) 
would be worth $1,024,450 million; when this sum is discounted back to the start of year 0 (at 
8%) the value is $431 million, identical to the discounted sum of costs shown in Table 1.  
If all benefits (of $47 million p.a.) from years 5 to 100 were reinvested into a fund 
earning an 8% return, the resulting fund would be worth $1,025,282 million; when this sum is 
discounted back to the start of year 0 the value is $432 million, identical to the discounted sum 
of benefits in Table 1. Thus government is essentially indifferent between investing in the 
specific infrastructure project or in another investment opportunity with the same risk profile 
that is expected to earn 8%. In other words, government could invest $431 million now in the 
chosen project and reproduce the same sum accruing to the populace in 101 years’ time that 
                                                 
13 We frame this discussion in terms of conventional CBA approaches rather than the more nuanced specifics 
adopted by NZTA in New Zealand. In practice, NZTA (2010) judges that rural travel time cost savings are worth 
approximately 40% more per hour than urban travel time cost savings (NZTA, 2010, Table 1 of page SP3-8). This 
estimate in turn is based on three types of use: (i) work travel purpose; (ii) commuting to/from work; (iii) other non-
work travel purposes. For a car driver, categories (ii) and (iii) are valued at 33% and 29% respectively of work travel 
time savings. For a cyclist or pedestrian, the equivalent ratios are 30% and 20% respectively (NZTA, 2010, Table 
A4.1).  23 
 
could be achieved by instead investing in the alternative project. Correspondingly, the population 
in 101 years’ time will be indifferent to the choice by government between the two projects.
14
The rationale underlying this application of CBA methodology is therefore based on the 
rate of return of a similar project (opportunity cost). It has nothing to do with any individual’s 
(or society’s) rate of time preference. Appendix 1 discusses the conceptual difference between 
the rate of return and the rate of time preference in more detail within the context of an 
individual’s inter-temporal consumption choice.
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Now divide the benefits in the baseline case into two different groups: tangible benefits 
resulting in higher incomes for firms and/or workers (e.g. hip replacements for manual workers) 
that can be reinvested, and intangible consumption benefits (e.g. hip replacements for the elderly 
who otherwise could not afford surgery), the benefits of which cannot be reinvested. We assume 
that the $47 million in benefit each year is split into $30 million of tangible benefits and $17 
million of intangible benefits. The discounted value of the costs remains $431 million; the 




With the split of benefits into tangibles and intangibles, we find that an investment of 
$431 million now produces a sum for the population 101 years hence that is only 64% of the 
sum that could have been earned by investing in the alternative project. Over the century, the 
population has enjoyed intangible benefits (that comprise the other 36% of total benefit) but 
none of these intangible benefits is available through reinvestment to the population in 101 years 
time. They are left 36% poorer as a result of the choice to invest in the chosen project as 
opposed to the alternative investment. 
  
Justification for treating intangible benefits as equivalent to tangible benefits in the CBA 
therefore cannot rest on an opportunity cost (rate of return) argument. Instead, a value 
judgement must be imposed that treats benefits to proximate generations more highly than those 
to future generations; moreover, the trade-off rate used to compare future relative to current 
generations must be identical to the rate of return earned from the particular risky investment 
that is being evaluated.  
This result has the corollary that if a different rate of return is applicable across projects, 
reflecting differing project risks (‘betas’), then the weight given to future relative to current 
                                                 
14 In this example we assume that each alternative produces the same set of opportunities, so there are no extra 
embedded options in one alternative relative to the other. 
15 We do so since many discussions on the use of discount rates in CBA appear to confuse the two concepts. 
16 Prior to rounding, the sum of these two figures is $432 million to the nearest million, as in the baseline case.  24 
 
generations differs from project to project. This corollary, however, has no logical justification: 
there is no reason that can be used to justify discounting the utility of a future generation 
differently when considering a range of projects with different risk.  
The conclusion that follows from this analysis is that conventional CBA analysis is not a 
sufficient tool for evaluating a project that has intangible benefits and where inter-generational 
comparisons are involved. However, in practice, CBA analysis is frequently applied in these 
situations. For instance, road investments are typically long-lived (so requiring a consideration of 
benefits for future generations) and typically have major benefits that cannot be reinvested (e.g. 
reduced congestion costs for leisure users). This demonstration of the inadequacy of CBA in 
such circumstances leads us into a deeper discussion of inter-generational (discounting) issues in 
the next section. 
6. Discount Rates 
The discussion in section 5 demonstrated that considerable care must be taken in 
interpreting and using discount rates. In particular, the reasoning behind the use of a chosen rate 
(e.g. a real rate of return - potentially with different risk premia, versus a rate of time preference) 
needs to be consistent with the assumptions built into the analysis. The choice of discount rate 
involves both (i) a conceptual decision as to which discounting concept to apply, and (ii) a 
numerical decision as to the appropriate rate given the chosen concept. 
In order to illustrate the importance of these issues, we examine an example that 
demonstrates the sensitivity of decisions based on standard CBA criteria to the choice of 
discount rate. We follow this discussion with a more in-depth discussion of appropriate concepts 
and rates. There has been much discussion of related topics in treatments elsewhere
17
Table 5 summarises the NPV and BCR of our baseline project for differing real discount 
rates varying from 1% to 10% p.a. The choice of discount rate for a long-lived project makes an 
enormous difference to the estimated viability of the project. For instance, if funding constraints 
mean that only projects with a BCR > 2 are undertaken, the baseline project would be 
undertaken if a discount rate of 4% were used, but it would not be undertaken with a higher 
discount rate. Furthermore, if the New Zealand government’s former standard discount rate of 
10% were adopted, the baseline project would drop from being a marginally acceptable 
 but many 
of the issues surrounding correct choice of discount rates are, at best, still unresolved. 
                                                 
17 See, for example, the extensive literature surveyed by Young (2002), Cowen (2007), Parker (2009) and Harrison 
(2010). 25 
 
development to one in which benefits are calculated at only three-quarters of the costs of the 
project. 
Table 5: Baseline & Alternate Projects with a Range of Discount Rates 
  Baseline*  Alternate** 










1%  2,289  5.6691  724  2.4768 
2%  1,366  3.8410  572  2.1901 
3%     839  2.7781  446  1.9453 
4%     518  2.1191  340  1.7354 
5%     312  1.6854  252  1.5546 
6%     172  1.3844  178  1.3982 
7%       73  1.1658  115  1.2624 
8%         0  1.0008  62  1.1440 
9%      -54  0.8724  17  1.0403 
10%      -96  0.7698  -21  0.9491 
* Baseline parameters are as per Table 1. 
** Alternate costs are as per baseline; benefits are $67 million p.a. (undiscounted) for years 5-25 inclusive, and 0 in 
all other years.    
 
The discount rate is important not only for determining whether a particular project 
should proceed but also for prioritising project options. Suppose two projects have the same 
cost structure but the benefits follow different time-paths. As an illustration, compare the 
baseline project with an alternate project that has (undiscounted) benefits of $67 million p.a. in 
years 5 to 25 inclusive, and no benefits thereafter. The second project is an alternative way of 
constructing the same project as the baseline, with identical cost structures; it has larger up-front 
benefits but those benefits last for only a comparatively short time.  
The alternate (shorter-term) project is preferred to baseline for any discount rate of 6% 
or above; at lower discount rates, the baseline project is preferred. The arithmetic reason for the 
switch in preference is that the longer term benefits (e.g. benefits over 25 years) of the baseline 
project are discounted heavily using higher discount rates whereas the alternate project has no 
benefits accruing beyond 25 years, so the higher discount rate does not reduce the value of 
longer term benefits in the alternate case. 
The conceptual reasoning behind choice of appropriate discount rate, and hence between 
choice of project, in part relates to the issues raised in the previous section about the nature of 
benefits that are expected to accrue across the two projects. If: (i) both projects have the same 
risk profile, and (ii) all benefits are tangible and will be reinvested in a project with the same risk 
and return over the full term of evaluation (i.e. through to year 100) then the analysis of the last 
section indicates that the cost of capital represents the appropriate discount rate. If either of 26 
 
these two assumptions does not hold perfectly, there is no conceptual reason to consider that the 
cost of capital is the appropriate rate to use to discount benefits. 
The previous section indicated one situation in which a discount rate that differs from 
the cost of capital is appropriate. That situation is where some of the benefits are not capable of 
being reinvested in a project with the same risk and return over the full term of evaluation. 
Intangible benefits fall into this category.  
There are numerous other cases in which the cost of capital is unlikely to represent the 
appropriate discount rate for an infrastructure investment. Parker (2009) provides an excellent 
survey of the issues surrounding choice of discount rate in various circumstances; a 
comprehensive summary will not be repeated here. He contrasts two principal approaches: 
setting the discount rate at the social opportunity cost (SOC) rate – which equates to the cost of 
capital concept discussed above – versus setting the discount rate using the social rate of time 
preference (SRTP). As discussed in Appendix 1, these are entirely different concepts and there is 
no reason that they should be equal. 
The SOC approach has been described in section 5. Conceptually, it is the more straight-
forward of the various approaches. Even so, Parker notes that the concept of risk (which is 
central to the choice of risk premium within the SOC-based discount rate) is tricky to define. For 
instance, what is the appropriate discount rate to use if the up-front costs are risky but the longer 
term benefits are certain (or, more generally, follow a different risk profile)? In that case, should 
the costs be discounted using a standard SOC-based discount rate while the benefits are 
discounted at a risk-free rate? 
More generally, how should the risk premium be calculated for projects that have 
national implications. The workhorse model to determine the cost of capital for individual 
projects is the capital asset pricing model (CAPM; Sharpe, 1964 and Lintner, 1965). The CAPM 
determines a project’s risk premium (relative to the risk-free rate) by virtue of its ‘beta’ which in 
turn reflects the sensitivity of the project’s returns to those of the overall market (the market 
portfolio). A project that is expected to record high returns at the same time as the market is 
doing poorly (and vice versa) will have a low risk premium, since that project provides useful 
diversification properties within an investment portfolio. Likewise, a project with strongly pro-
cyclical returns will have a high risk premium (no matter what its individual variance of returns). 
At a broader economic level, the workhorse model to determine risk premia is the 
consumption capital asset pricing model (CCAPM; Breeden 1979). At this level, a project that is 
expected to record high returns at the same time as the broader economy (and consumption) is 27 
 
doing poorly will be accorded a low risk premium, since that project provides useful 
diversification properties for the wider economy. A project with strongly pro-cyclical returns 
relative to the broader economy will be accorded a high risk premium. 
A major irrigation scheme is an example where the CCAPM may imply a low risk 
premium. Treasury research (Buckle et al, 2007) indicates that rainfall is a material determinant of 
New Zealand’s cyclical economic outcomes, with drought negatively affecting each of national 
production (GDP), domestic demand (GNE) and exports. An irrigation scheme has its highest 
payoffs precisely when the economy is at a low ebb due to drought; thus the CCAPM determines 
that irrigation schemes should be accorded a low risk premium. Indeed, if the returns to an 
irrigation scheme are counter-cyclical (i.e. a negative consumption beta) the appropriate discount 
rate would be below the risk free (government borrowing) rate.  
From a government’s perspective, why might this make sense? If a government is 
concerned with having a moderately stable revenue stream, it will value highly a scheme that 
produces tax revenues at times when other tax revenues are declining. An irrigation scheme that 
meets this requirement acts to offset other risks to the government’s revenue stream, thus having 
a risk-reducing role for government’s overall revenues. This risk-reducing role implies that the 
risk premium is negative for the scheme; thus the appropriate SOC-based rate is below 
government’s risk-free borrowing rate. 
Choosing an appropriate discount rate under the SOC-based approach is essentially a 
technical decision relating to risk. More difficult issues arise when the assumptions justifying this 
approach are not fully met. In situations where some benefits are intangible and/or we cannot be 
certain that the tangible returns will be reinvested in a project with the same risk and return over 
the full term of evaluation, the SOC-based approach is incomplete as a descriptor of the 
appropriate discount rate. 
Consider a situation in which the current generation cares about the welfare 
(consumption) of both the next generation (children) and the one after that (grand-children) but 
there is a risk that the children may be profligate and may not act to protect the living standards 
of the grand-children.
18
                                                 
18 This is the simplest case; the argument follows if the current generation cares about great-grandchildren, but the 
children may not care about their grandchildren, etc. 
 The current generation could save now (at a market rate of return) to 
provide resources for both future generations. The amount saved for future generations will be 
determined by the market rate of return relative to the current generation’s inter-generational 
rate of time preference (i.e. the rate at which it values the welfare of future generations relative to 
its own).  28 
 
Once the amount set aside for future generations is determined, the SOC-based 
approach would allocate the investments according to market rates of return, since once the 
quantum of savings is determined, the task becomes a technical one to invest in projects that 
produce the best risk-adjusted return for each of the next two generations. However, the grand-
children have no control over the decisions of the children. If government (or individuals) 
allocate all savings into a financial vehicle (e.g. a government investment fund) there is nothing 
to prevent the children’s generation from expropriating some or all of the investments intended 
for the grand-children’s benefit and leaving the grand-children with fewer resources than 
intended by the current generation.  
This is a classic time consistency problem. One way around this time consistency 
problem is for the current generation to invest in assets that provide a return to the 
grandchildren and which cannot be expropriated by the children. Long-lived infrastructure 
investments may be of this type. For instance, a concrete based road may last with little 
maintenance for 50 years, whereas a bitumen road may require substantial maintenance to still be 
operating in peak condition in 30 years time. If there is concern that a future generation may not 
allocate resources to maintain infrastructure for a future generation (noting that for a generation 
after 1984 there was significant deferred maintenance in relation to many infrastructure assets), 
then the current generation may choose to invest in “future-proofed” infrastructure that 
mitigates the potential for infrastructure decline through the next generation. In this situation, a 
concrete-based road may be preferred to a bitumen-based road even though the conventional 
BCR for the latter is higher than for the concrete road.
19
The key element of this example is that the discount rate applied to long-lived projects 
must take account not only of what projects could theoretically be invested in over time, but what 
projects will actually be invested in over time. If actual returns to public investments in future are 
expected to fall below the theoretical optimum, then current investments should build in the 
expected future return to alternative investments, which is lower than the optimum return. 
 
A counter-argument to this latter point is that if the private sector could achieve the 
optimum return on its investments then this is the appropriate required rate of return since an 
alternative for the current generation is simply not to proceed with a certain infrastructure 
investment (that may yield only 7% return) when leaving the funds with the private sector 
instead returns 8%. Nevertheless, in this situation there is still no guarantee that the 
                                                 
19 Another argument favouring a concrete-based road relates to the issue of intangibles. Future maintenance  of a 
bitumen-based road will cause extra congestion during long periods of road works; the saving of this extra 
congestion is a benefit of a concrete road but conventional BCR discounts this intangible saving at the cost of 
capital rather than the rate of time preference, whereas it is the latter that is theoretically appropriate. 29 
 
grandchildren’s generation will benefit from the private sector’s expenditure choices. Its 
investments may provide a larger return for the children but that may not be available for 
subsequent generations. For instance, a future government may tax the children’s returns to 
provide short-term election-driven consumption benefits. If the current generation cares about 
future generations and has concerns that the private or public sectors over coming decades may 
be profligate (relative to the current generation’s concerns for the future) then locking in long-
lived infrastructure investments is one method it can use to protect the welfare of future 
generations. 
Caplin and Leahy (2004), Cowen (2007) and Creedy (2007) formalise some of these 
issues. In each case, the point is made that applying an inter-generational discount rate (i.e. 
valuing a future generation’s welfare relative to our own) involves an inter-personal welfare 
comparison that is of the same type as trading off the welfare of one member of the current 
generation with that of another. Economists are typically reluctant to make inter-personal 
welfare comparisons within a generation, leaving these decisions to political decision-makers.
20
Creedy discusses such issues in detail, noting that inter-personal value judgements are 
being made whether one advocates use of a discount rate based on a market interest rate or one 
advocates a (near) zero rate of time preference. The latter rate is argued for in relation to climate 
change effects within the Stern Review (2007).
 
In turn, this implies that it is futile to search for a single “correct” estimate of the social rate of 
time preference. Nevertheless, application of an inter-temporal discount rate to the welfare 
(consumption) of individuals across generations is routinely practiced, inevitably valuing the 
trade-off between the welfare of future generations and that of the current generation. The 
question is whether the rate that is used (whether it be the cost of capital or some other rate) 
accords with decision-makers’ rate of time preference. 
21 Creedy argues from first principles that these 
value judgements should be made explicitly and debated rather than being hidden behind 
technical complexities.
22
Caplin and Leahy run the thought experiment of testing whether inter-generational trade-
offs are time consistent in the sense that the next generation will agree with the decisions made 
   
                                                 
20 Curiously, however, typical CBA treats the marginal dollar received by each individual as having equal impact on 
overall welfare whether it accrues to a starving individual or to a multi-millionaire. In the absence of lump-sum 
taxes, this approach accords with no known philosophical school of thought (see: Blackorby and Donaldson, 1990; 
Sen, 2009). 
21 The Stern Review deals with catastrophic risk; i.e. where, because of climate change, there is a chance of mass 
deaths or even (near-) extinction of the human race and/or many other biological organisms. In this case, as stressed 
also by Cowen, the economist’s typical marginal analysis is not an appropriate tool. These issues are dealt with in 
more detail in Appendix 1.3. 
22 Technical arguments include approaches by Weitzman (1998 and 2001) and Lowe (2008). 30 
 
by the current generation. For instance, from today’s viewpoint are we happy that the 
infrastructure deficit built up since the early 1980s was optimal, or do we instead consider it 
would have been preferable for the last generation to provide more infrastructure investment 
than actually occurred? If, ex ante, the deferred investment (coupled with high social 
expenditures) was an optimal strategy but, ex post, that strategy is viewed as sub-optimal, then 
there is a disagreement between the two generations about the rate of time discount. When this 
situation occurs, there is no single objective rate of time discount; we wish that the last 
generation had paid more heed to our generation when it was taking its expenditure decisions 
than it chose to. 
Cowen elaborates on this point. He notes that processes of substantial economic reform 
often involve a significant loss of production while the reform process is undertaken. The loss is 
accepted given an expectation of higher subsequent growth rates once dislocation and 
reorganisation of the economy has run its course. This was the experience of New Zealand after 
1984, and was also the experience of many transition countries in Eastern Europe. Significant 
economic reform is generally only undertaken if the longer term growth benefits of reform are 
considered to outweigh the transitional costs. The inter-temporal discount rate materially affects 
this calculus. 
For instance, consider the New Zealand reforms. Grimes (1996) shows that over the 
seven years prior to the 1984 reforms (i.e. 1978-1984), New Zealand’s GDP growth rate was 
0.9% p.a. below that of the OECD average for the same period. For the following seven years 
(i.e. 1985-1991) during the transition period, New Zealand’s GDP growth rate was 2.4% p.a. 
below that of the OECD. After 1991, the New Zealand growth rate was expected to increase. If 
it was known at the outset of the reforms that this transition would occur but that the New 
Zealand economy would henceforth grow at the OECD average rate from 1992 onwards (i.e. at 
a rate 0.9% p.a. above New Zealand’s pre-reform growth rate), would the reforms have been 
considered worthwhile ex ante? 
Imagine that the policy-makers had a fifty year time horizon at the start of the reforms, 
and that they discounted future incomes back to 1984 dollars using an 8% real discount rate. By 
2034, fifty years after the start of the reforms, the New Zealand economy would be producing 
32% more per annum than in the baseline (no reform) case. However, once future production is 
discounted back to 1984 with an 8% discount rate, discounted total production over the first 
fifty years with the reforms would be less than if the reforms had never occurred. This result is 
despite the New Zealand GDP growth rate being 0.9% p.a. higher with the reforms for the final 
43 years of the evaluation period. 31 
 
Cowen makes the point that use of a high intertemporal discount rate rarely makes 
economic reform worthwhile. In other words, with a high discount rate, low growth policies that 
are already in place are preferred to an economic policy that favours greater future economic 
growth. The reason for this result is that near-term transitional costs (accruing to the current 
generation) are discounted very lightly while benefits for future generations are discounted 
heavily. Cowen’s insight with regard to economic reform programmes applies more specifically 
to long-lived infrastructure investments: applying a high discount rate to infrastructure 
investments that are designed to increase the productive potential of the economy results instead 
in a policy that locks in a consumption-oriented low-growth economy rather than one with a 
higher GDP growth rate and higher future living standards.  
On the other hand, if all government investment projects used a low discount rate, the 
result would be a severe crowding out of private sector investment. Cowen’s analysis therefore 
applies to projects that have clear long-lived benefits that will accrue to a future generation and 
that would not otherwise be pursued by the private sector.
23
Use of a high discount rate for productive projects becomes of greater concern if: (a) 
citizen’s welfare (“utility”) at any point in time is shaped at least in part with reference to living 
standards in other countries,
  
24
Consider, for instance, if New Zealanders compare their living standards with Australia; 
they are happy if they can keep pace with their neighbour but feel increasingly unhappy the 
further they fall behind. Furthermore, imagine the case where – taken in isolation – the optimal 
discount rate to apply to like infrastructure projects in each country is 8%, but that Australia 
chooses instead to adopt a 6% discount rate. It increases taxes in the near-term to fund the 
increased number of projects that are thereby commissioned. The result will be that Australia 
will have reduced short-term consumption and will invest more in long-lived infrastructure 
projects than New Zealand. The returns to that investment will induce a higher standard of 
living across the Tasman in future years relative to New Zealand.  
 (b) comparator countries use a lower discount rate for their 
productive long-lived infrastructure projects, and (c) the current generation cares about the 
relative living standards of future generations in New Zealand.  
In this case – even if New Zealand were to adopt the “optimal” discount rate policy 
viewed from an isolationist perspective – New Zealanders would in future feel worse-off because 
                                                 
23 This is a similar set of projects to those referred to by Henry (2010) as falling within scope for government 
decisions within Australia. 
24 The empirical evidence (i.e. the “Easterlin Paradox”) is that national measures of absolute wellbeing in developed 
countries tend not to increase over time; instead, relative living standards are more prominent determinants of 
individuals’ (and countries’) happiness (Easterlin, 1974). 32 
 
their living standards had dropped below those of Australia. With free labour mobility, the result 
will be migration of New Zealanders to Australia to take advantage of its higher relative 
infrastructure stock, higher productivity and higher living standards (an example of resource 
mobility as considered in section 3). 
Parker (2009) summarises the observed choices of discount rates for major long-lived 
infrastructure projects across OECD countries. Within Europe (including the United Kingdom) 
most countries use rates within the 3-5% range; the United States appears to use a rate at the 
bottom end of this range for long-lived projects. Rates across Australia vary by State, but appear 
to be centred on the 6-7% range; however Henry (2010) notes that in certain circumstances, 
government in Australia may nevertheless approve projects that fail a CBA using a conventional 
discount rate. Henry states (p.13): “There remains an important role for public investment in 
infrastructure. There may be infrastructure projects that are of strategic importance and that may 
not pass a private cost-benefit analysis; perhaps because the costs and benefits need to be 
amortised over too many decades or for other reasons.” 
In New Zealand, the Treasury
25
The use of discount rates for differing types of investment indicate that the 
recommended rates are not based on a (single) rate of time preference; rather they are explicitly 
related to a market cost of capital across sectors (based on the CAPM). These market costs are 
used to discount “benefits in a later time period” across all classes of benefit. This formulation 
therefore adopts an opportunity cost approach. As discussed above, this approach is only valid 
in very specific circumstances that do not generally hold for long-lived infrastructure projects.  
 recommends a default rate of 8% for infrastructure 
except for “telecommunications, media and technology IT and equipment” for which it 
recommends a 9.5% rate; general purpose office buildings have a recommended discount rate of 
6%.
 Treasury states that it anticipates these rates “will be appropriate for most public sector 
expenditure proposals that involve an expectation of benefits in a later time period”. However 
they are careful to note: “Different rates may be adopted in cases where it can be justified on 
objective opportunity-cost grounds.”   
By comparison, many of the European countries cited by Parker adopt an explicit (low) 
social rate of time preference to trade off future relative to current benefits when considering 
infrastructure investments. In these circumstances, New Zealand, with an 8% real discount rate, 
will tend to be “infrastructure-capital-shallow” relative to other developed countries. As 
discussed in Appendix 1.2, this result fully incorporates the funding (liability) side of the 
                                                 
25 See Treasury Circular 2008/13. 33 
 
investment project. At the simplest level, the irrelevance of funding choices is most obvious 
when investment choices are being made within a given fiscal expenditure envelope. In this case, 
taxes and debt liabilities are unaltered by the choice of expenditure options, but the timing of 
benefits does differ across generations.  
By choosing the current approach, New Zealand policy-makers have signalled that they 
favour current consumption over future production, relative to the choices made in other 
countries. This choice may be optimal viewed from the perspective of an individual current 
consumer, but a future resident will favour the choices made by government agencies in other 
countries and accordingly will opt to migrate to those countries to enjoy their higher future living 
standards. 
7. Traded versus Non-Traded Sector Issues 
Traditional neoclassical analysis incorporates an equilibrium result that, at the margin, an 
extra dollar invested in one sector is as productive as an extra dollar invested in any other 
sector.
26
The original paper made the conjecture that, at the margin, an infrastructure investment 
that boosted productivity in the traded goods sector would have greater economy-wide payoffs 
than an identical infrastructure investment that boosted productivity in the non-traded sector. In 
Appendix 2, we develop the model further to examine conditions under which this conjecture is 
borne out. The only changes made to the original model of Grimes (2009b) are that productivity 
in each of the traded goods and non-traded goods sectors is related positively to the quantity of 
government infrastructure investment servicing that sector (denoted GN  and GT  respectively).
 While this result holds for any individual firm, the analysis in Grimes (2009b) calls this 
result into question at the aggregate economy level. That model incorporated two sectors, a 
traded goods sector and a non-traded goods sector. The traded good can be conceptualised as 
exports (or as a consumption good that competes directly with imports) while a non-traded good 
cannot be traded internationally (e.g. haircuts). Production in each sector is undertaken using 
labour and capital, where the capital good is imported.
  
27
                                                 
26 Optimally, this should hold for both private and public sector investments. 
 
A lump sum tax is levied on individuals sufficient to meet the capital costs and depreciation 
relating to the two sets of infrastructure.  
27 While the model can make a conceptual distinction between infrastructure that services the traded and non-traded 
sectors respectively, in practice much infrastructure will support both sectors. Nevertheless, some infrastructure 
favours one sector more than the other; for instance fibre to the home may favour the non-traded sector more than 
a road to an export port. Note that the infrastructure itself is not being conceptualised as being in one or other 
sector; it is a capital good that services either/both sector(s). 34 
 
As outlined in Appendix 2, we analyse the impacts of increasing GN  and GT  individually 
by 1% on the following variables: non-traded sector production (YN), traded sector production 
(YT), total production (Y=YN +YT), total consumption (C =CN +CT, where non-traded goods 
consumption, CN =YN ), and utility of the representative agent (U). The last of these variables is 
the appropriate measure of ‘welfare’ in this model; as we will see, welfare and production (i.e. 
GDP) may move quite distinctly in our simulations.  
The model is run with two separate economic structures. The first, which mirrors that in 
the original paper, has symmetric consumption; i.e. in the baseline (prior to increasing either GN  
or GT) consumption of non-traded goods equals consumption of traded goods. In this 
configuration, production of traded goods exceeds production of non-traded goods with the 
extra traded goods production used to finance the required imports of capital goods (to meet the 
depreciation of the private and public capital stock). The second configuration sets production 
of traded goods equal to the production of non-traded goods; in this case, consumption of non-
traded goods exceeds consumption of traded goods (again so that exports can finance the 
importation of capital goods). 
Table 6 summarises the results of the four simulations (i.e. increases to each of GN  and 
GT  with each of the two model configurations). With equal consumption shares (in which traded 
goods production exceeds non-traded goods production), an increase in infrastructure for the 
traded goods sector (GT) has a greater impact on overall production (Y) than does an increase in 
infrastructure for the non-traded sector (GN). An arithmetic reason for this is that the traded 
sector is initially larger than the non-traded sector, but this is not the full story. The key 
difference is that the greater traded sector productivity engendered by the increase in GT enables 
purchase of extra capital equipment funded by the extra traded sector exports. This capital effect 
can be seen through the much greater increase in Y (0.23%) than C (0.07%) in column 2.  
Table 6: General Equilibrium Effects of Government Infrastructure Investments* 
  Equal consumption shares  Equal production shares 
GN  ↑ 1%  GT  ↑ 1%  GN  ↑ 1%  GT  ↑ 1% 
YN  0.08  -0.03  0.08  -0.03 
YT  0.06  0.36  0.12  0.42 
Y  0.07  0.23  0.10  0.19 
C  -0.02  0.07  0.02  0.02 
U  -0.02  0.07  0.02  0.02 
* The figure in each cell is the % change in the variable listed in the first column caused by a 1% increase in the type 
of infrastructure listed across the top. “Equal consumption shares” and “Equal production shares” correspond to 
the two model configurations; see Appendix 2. GN  is infrastructure servicing the non-traded goods sector; GT  is 
infrastructure servicing the traded goods sector; YN is non-traded sector production; YT is traded sector production; 
Y  is total production, C is total consumption; U  is utility (welfare) of the representative agent.  
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Utility increases with the increase in GT as the benefits of the extra production outweigh 
the loss in income via extra taxation to pay for the infrastructure. By contrast, the increase in 
non-traded sector infrastructure, GN, leads to a reduction in overall welfare since the cost to the 
agents through taxes to fund the extra infrastructure capital is not recouped by a sufficient 
increase in production. In this situation, residents are made worse off by government increasing 
its (non-traded sector) infrastructure investment. 
With the second model configuration (equal production shares, in which non-traded 
consumption considerably exceeds traded consumption) the effects are more finely balanced. An 
increase in GT again increases output by more than would a commensurate increase in GN, for 
the same reason as before – that the greater traded goods productivity enables greater imports of 
private sector capital. Now, however, the welfare effects of the two policies are identical, 
reflecting the assumed much greater consumption of non-traded goods in the baseline case.  
The parameter assumptions in this latter case imply that consumption of traded goods 
(imported goods and goods capable of being exported) represents only 27% of total 
consumption, which is an under-estimate of the actual traded goods share of consumption in the 
economy. This case therefore appears to be a limiting one that is unlikely to arise. In practice, 
one may conclude that utility is likely to increase more with an investment in infrastructure that 
raises traded sector productivity relative to a same-sized investment that raises non-traded sector 
productivity. 
The results from this general equilibrium model imply two key conclusions with respect 
to the targeting of infrastructure investment. First, an infrastructure investment in the traded 
sector has a greater impact on aggregate production than does an ex ante identical infrastructure 
investment for the non-traded sector. This effect arises, in part, because of the greater scope for 
importing capital goods that arises when traded sector expands, an effect that does not occur 
with an increase in non-traded sector production. 
Second, aggregate production effects differ from overall welfare effects. Measuring 
benefits solely by increases in production may lead to a miscalculation of the overall net benefits 
of a project. One factor that affects the relationship between production and welfare outcomes is 
changes in relative prices between traded and non-traded goods that arise as productivity of one 
sector increases relative to another. As explained in Grimes (2009), an increase in non-traded 
sector production causes a decrease in the relative price of non-traded goods since domestic 
consumers are the only source of demand for those goods; by contrast, the price of traded goods 
is determined by world demand. An increase in infrastructure for the traded sector has no 36 
 
adverse price effect on New Zealand producers whereas an infrastructure investment that boosts 
productivity of non-traded producers leads to a partially offsetting income drop through falling 
prices. In this case, domestic producers benefit more from a boost to infrastructure investment 
that supports the traded sector than a commensurate infrastructure investment supporting the 
non-traded sector.  
8. Conclusions 
Cost benefit analysis (CBA) is a useful tool for many project investment applications. It 
is especially useful for making comparisons between alternative specifications that are designed 
to produce similar benefits. It makes explicit the nature and size of projected costs and benefits 
of a project, as well as the timing of those costs and benefits. Ideally, both tangible and intangible 
benefits and costs are included in the calculations. Wider economic benefits that may arise, for 
instance, from agglomeration externalities within cities, are also included. Furthermore, a CBA 
makes explicit how future values for costs and benefits are traded off against current values. The 
discipline involved in making these comparisons results in far better project evaluation than 
would occur if there were no formal model for comparing the worth of alternative investments. 
Within any CBA, there are some crucial judgements that must be made. These 
judgements can materially alter the perceived worth of an individual project and can alter the 
ranking of alternative projects. Estimation of the scope and scale of wider economic benefits is 
an example of one such judgement that is required. Another important judgement that affects 
the worth of long-lived projects is the choice of discount rate. The analysis in this paper, and 
elsewhere, shows that considerable thought needs to be applied to the discount rate choice. 
There is no single “correct” discount rate choice that covers all project types. 
In certain circumstances, a cost of capital (incorporating an appropriate risk premium 
derived from market prices for commensurate risks) constitutes an appropriate discount rate for 
a project. Circumstances where this choice is most appropriate include where returns from the 
proposed project can all be reinvested at the same rate (and with the same risk profile) as the 
project under consideration, and where the project could be undertaken equally by another agent 
(e.g. by both the private and public sectors).  
Even within this approach, the choice of risk premium within the cost of capital is not 
trivial. A standard capital asset pricing model (CAPM) approach would measure the project’s 
“beta” which places priority on the project’s covariance of returns with the aggregate market 
return. Under this (standard) approach, riskiness is not measured by the volatility (e.g. standard 37 
 
deviation) of project returns or by measures of return uncertainty. Individual infrastructure 
projects could therefore have quite different costs of capital (and hence discount rates) from one 
another. For instance, a project with returns that had zero covariance with the market return 
would have a cost of capital set at the risk-free (government borrowing) rate.  
If government is concerned about stability of aggregate GDP or aggregate tax flows, the 
measure of the appropriate risk premium changes. A project that yields high returns at a time 
when aggregate GDP and/or tax-flows are falling would have a negative risk premium according 
to the Consumption CAPM, which is the appropriate model in these circumstances. For 
instance, an irrigation project that delivers its highest returns in times of drought (and associated 
cyclical economic decline) should have a cost of capital that is below the risk-free rate. This 
variation in discount rates, even where a cost of capital approach is used, demonstrates the care 
that must be adopted when choosing a particular discount rate for an infrastructure investment. 
Where the benefit stream in part comprises intangible consumption benefits (that are not 
fully substitutable for other privately financed consumption benefits) the cost of capital no 
longer necessarily constitutes the appropriate discount rate for an infrastructure project. The 
reason is that intangible consumption benefits cannot be reinvested at the chosen cost of capital. 
In these circumstances, investment versus consumption choices inevitably arise, and involve an 
inter-personal value judgement between benefits for current agents versus those in the future. 
The analysis in this paper demonstrates that adoption of an 8% p.a. real discount rate (the New 
Zealand Treasury’s current standard rate) means that - for the same tax flows and liability 
structure - policy-makers prefer to have one unit of benefit now in place of six units of benefit in 
one generation’s (25 years) time.  
For instance, one hip operation today is preferred to having the wealth in 25 years to 
deliver six hip operations at that time. At the Treasury’s former preferred 10% p.a. real discount 
rate, one hip operation today would have been preferred to having the wealth to deliver nine hip 
operations in 25 years time. Because we are dealing with inter-personal comparisons of benefit, 
we cannot say that these value judgements are necessarily “wrong”. They reflect a policy choice 
that current consumption is strongly preferred to investment and hence to future consumption. 
Citizens of countries that make such a choice can have a higher level of current benefit than 
citizens of countries in which policy-makers choose to invest for a future generation. Conversely, 
future citizens in the initial high consumption country will be worse off than future citizens in a 
country that consumes less initially and invests more in long-lived projects. 38 
 
Where citizens have an option to migrate from the “consumer country” to the 
“investment country” it could be argued that an optimal policy is for the current generation to 
consume today in the former country and for the next generation to migrate to the latter 
country, taking advantage of that country’s infrastructure capital that its previous generation built 
up. However, if current citizens care about the welfare of future citizens domiciled in their own 
country, and have a wish to see future generations largely remain in the home country, this 
strategy can no longer be considered optimal. In those circumstances, current citizens need to 
give greater priority to investments in projects that yield long-term returns and spend less on 
policies that deliver near-term consumption benefits.    
While complicated, the choice of discount rate is essentially a technical choice within a 
standard CBA. There are more complex circumstances in which a standard CBA approach may 
be inadequate, or even inappropriate. Potentially the most important characteristic that may 
render a conventional CBA inappropriate is where a potential project opens up options for 
investment in future projects with uncertain returns and where: (a) information about those 
returns is forthcoming only after the initial project is completed, or (b) potential positive returns 
from the future projects diminish over time.  
In case (a), the initial project must be undertaken in order to find out whether or not to 
proceed to the next stage within a sequence of projects. Examples may include investment in a 
fibre broadband network (the initial project) where the subsequent projects are in the form of 
potential private sector investments that utilise the greater speed and bandwidth that fibre 
affords. Other examples may include: investments in basic research (with potential 
commercialisation of research findings constituting the subsequent projects); improved (public 
and private) transport networks that open up new possibilities for firm and household location 
and trade; minerals exploration, opening up opportunities to extract any reserves that are found; 
and the electricity transmission grid, opening up opportunities for new generation plants and/or 
new major users of electricity. 
In case (b), returns to investment are time dependent. A notable example may be where 
countries are competing for the location of major firms that, once their location is chosen, incur 
substantial sunk costs and so are reluctant to move again. Another example may be where 
agglomeration externalities combine with path dependence to establish a cluster for a new 
industry that may be reliant on a particular form of infrastructure and/or technology. The fibre 
example is again relevant here, with a cluster of high-tech firms potentially locating in countries 
or centres that are early adopters of large-scale fibre provision. 39 
 
The potential importance of options created by particular infrastructure investments 
means that a standard “needs analysis” may be an insufficient basis from which to begin an ex 
ante evaluation of a potential investment. In the cases discussed above, an “opportunities 
analysis” also needs to be included prospectively. Furthermore, it is important not to restrict 
opportunities to those that may be exercised (or even internalised) just by the infrastructure 
provider or by existing agents. Future agents (e.g. new migrants, start-up firms or international 
firms not yet present in the country) may be the agents that take advantage of opportunities that 
are created. A corollary of this approach is that disinvestment decisions need to take account of 
future opportunities that are potentially lost through a decision to scrap existing infrastructure. 
The opportunity (or option) approach may be particularly important where discontinuities are 
possible. For instance, a decision to close (large parts of) the rail network owing to its inability to 
pass a conventional CBA may turn out to have a large negative outcome if fuel prices were to 
surge massively, in which case the option to increase rail traffic would no longer be available. Of 
course, this option value must be weighed against the costs of ongoing operational deficits in 
determining the closure decision. 
Similarly, if fibre becomes a “must-have” business attribute, a decision not to invest 
could have discontinuous consequences on the location decisions of firms (at least in 
information-rich sectors).
 In the fibre case, this option effect must be weighed against a 
competing option effect: a ubiquitous fibre network represents a large sunk cost, and it may turn 
out that future mobile technologies offer a much cheaper, but equally effective, delivery 
mechanism. In this case, the standard investment under uncertainty result would favour delaying 
fibre investments until more is known about the benefits of the alternative technologies. A 
decision therefore needs to be taken about the potential for returns to be time dependent when 
choosing whether to delay or bring forward a major fibre investment. 
Network effects are another potential source of discontinuity arising from infrastructure 
investments. A single investment project may produce limited returns in the absence of other 
complementary investments. However the experience of master-planning at the regional level 
demonstrates that a suite of complementary investments can produce much greater returns than 
the sum of the returns to each investment where each of those investments was considered by 
itself.  
This observation, which has long established roots in the economic development 
literature, means that a coordinated approach to at least some infrastructure investments is 
required. For instance, it indicates the advisability of coordinating transport investments, land 
use control decisions, energy reticulation, plus schooling and other social investments at a spatial 40 
 
level. At a broader level, it has implications for national strategic investment choices. For 
instance, a decision to invest heavily in fibre may logically be coordinated with a decision to 
favour training in information-related skills; a decision to substantially upgrade Auckland’s 
passenger transport network may logically be complemented by ensuring that opportunities to 
expand the housing and commercial building stocks are enhanced, while ensuring that each of 
electricity, gas and water provision is secure for a potentially much larger city. 
In making these judgements, the endogenous flows of resources across regions must be 
considered. Capital and labour both flow across regional and national boundaries to where 
earnings opportunities (plus amenity values) are highest. For a small country such as New 
Zealand with open labour and capital markets, this means that an investment in one region 
should be considered within an Australasian, rather than a New Zealand-specific, context. For an 
instance, an investment that boosts Christchurch’s productive potential will reallocate resources 
across Australasia (of which Australia forms the bulk) rather than primarily constituting a 
foregone benefit for other parts of New Zealand. 
The importance of an over-arching national strategic approach to infrastructure 
provision is highlighted by findings that certain classes of infrastructure investments have 
favourable long-term economic effects relative to others. The importance of infrastructure 
investments which produce returns that are capable of being reinvested, rather than consumed 
immediately, is one such class of favoured investment. A standard CBA treats a dollar produced 
for intangible consumption today equally with a dollar produced through servicing an export 
industry, but the consumption benefit is lost immediately whereas the productive benefit can be 
reinvested. Using the fibre example, equivalent fibre investments to the home and to the firm 
respectively may produce equal initial gains to those recipients. However, returns from the latter 
investment (i.e. to the firm) can be reinvested for the future whereas the former return (to the 
consumer) may produce only a fleeting intangible benefit. 
Furthermore, the analysis indicates that where a differentiation can be made, an 
infrastructure investment that services the export sector (or, more generally, the traded goods 
sector including import substitution activities) provides a greater overall benefit to the economy 
than one that services the non-traded productive sector (i.e. goods and services that are not 
traded internationally). This is the case even where the marginal returns to equivalent firms from 
equal sized investments are the same. The reasoning here is twofold: First, in a capital-importing 
country such as New Zealand, export receipts are required to purchase the capital goods that 
produce both traded and non-traded goods and services. Second, exports can generally be 
increased without causing prices to fall since New Zealand producers form only a small 41 
 
proportion of all suppliers of the commodity. By contrast, an increase in non-traded goods 
production causes the price to move against producers of those goods since domestic demand 
for these goods is limited. 
The combined effect of these various findings is that a national infrastructure strategy 
may concentrate on supporting infrastructure investments that: (i) service the internationally 
traded productive sector; (ii) exhibit network complementarities with other infrastructure 
investments; and (iii) create new opportunities for further value-enhancing investments that take 
advantage of the initial investment project. These considerations are all largely absent from a 
conventional CBA evaluation of a single prospective project.  
In many cases, the considerations just outlined will not be material, and a conventional 
CBA will form an appropriate prospective evaluation tool. However where some or all of the 
above considerations are germane, conventional CBA tools need to be supplemented by analysis 
that incorporates the larger strategic aspects of a project. Furthermore, the essence of a strategic 
approach is that a “bottom up” aggregation of one-off projects will not be optimal; network 
benefits and new opportunities will be missed under such a regime. Some over-arching 
investment principles and strategies, emphasising production in internationally traded sectors 
combined with network effects and the creation of option values, are required. If adoption of 
these strategies were combined with a decision to place greater weight on the value of future 
production relative to current consumption, an increasingly productive New Zealand economy 
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APPENDIX 1:  Intertemporal Optimisation Issues 
A1.1  Simple Two-Period Consumption Model 
 The term ‘discount rate’ has been used to refer to multiple concepts, causing confusion 
when undertaking intertemporal analysis. In this Appendix we outline a simple two-period model 
of consumption faced by an individual in order to clarify the concepts.  
The individual has nominal (i.e. dollar) income, y, in period 1 which she can use either to 
consume in period 1 or she can save some or all of it. The number of physical units of the good 
that are consumed in period 1 is denoted c1, with each unit purchased at price p1. Her nominal 
consumption in period 1 is therefore p1c1 and consequently her savings balance at the end of 
period 1 is y - p1c1. 
The individual positively values consumption in both periods, but earns no further 
income in the second period other than what she earns on her savings. The nominal interest rate 
between periods 1 and 2 is denoted i. In period 2, she can therefore spend her savings plus 
interest (leaving no bequest) and consume c2 units of the good, each purchased at price p2. Her 
budget constraint is therefore given by equation (A1):  
) 1 ( * ) ( 1 1 2 2 i c p y c p + − =                 (A1) 
We assume that the consumer has the same single period utility function in each period 
of life, u(c), but that in making her decisions at the outset, she displays some impatience, 
exhibited through her rate of time preference, ρ. The resulting lifetime utility function is given by 
(A2): 
) ( ) 1 ( ) ( 2
1
1 c u c u U
− + + = ρ                    (A2) 
Note that ρ is a characteristic of the individual’s utility function. It remains the same no 
matter what happens to the market rate of return (i) or any other variable.  
The individual maximises U subject to the budget constraint through her choices of c1 
and c2. This gives the standard result for the dynamics of her consumption path in (A3), where 
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28 Note that (1+r) = (1+i)/(1+π) where π is the rate of inflation given by (p2-p1 )/p1 . 46 
 
To make (A3) easier to interpret, assume that u(c) takes the constant relative risk aversion 
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From (A5), future consumption will be raised relative to current consumption: (a) the 
higher is the real rate of return, and (b) the lower is the rate of time preference. Importantly in 
terms of understanding CBA methodology, both the rate of return and the rate of time 
preference are important in determining whether current consumption should be high relative to 
the future or not. The two rates are entirely separate concepts and both are important in 
determining the allocation of resources across time. 
We note here that there is no logical reason, at least in a small open economy, for there 
to be any relationship between ρ and r. The former is a property solely of the individual’s utility 
function; the latter is determined by the world capital market. Even at the global level, 
Samuelson (1958) showed that there is no relationship between the two variables. 
A1.2  Social Rate of Time Preference 
The simple framework used above may also be used, with care, to analyse the case of two 
separate generations (1 and 2). The utility function is now interpreted as a social welfare 
function. In that case, the social planner will wish to allocate resources between current 
consumption and consumption for the next generation according to (A3) or, with CRRA utility, 
using (A5). Thus, at the inter-generational level, both ρ (now interpreted as the social rate of 
time preference) and r are again important.  
Importantly, however, Cowen (2001) notes that the social rate of time preference (i.e. the 
trade-off across generations) cannot be interpreted as having the same value as an individual’s 
rate of time preference (i.e. the trade-off by an individual within her own lifetime). The latter 
involves an individual making a sacrifice today (i.e. to save instead of consume) so as to receive a 
greater consumption benefit tomorrow. By contrast, the future generation makes no sacrifice 47 
 
today in order to consume when they are alive, for the simple reason that they are not alive 
today.  
To give a feeling for the importance of this argument, consider the counter view that the 
social rate of time preference should be considered as being equal to an individual’s rate of time 
preference, and further assume that the latter is taken to be equivalent to the real cost of capital, 
taken to be 8% p.a. Now imagine that in 1066, William the Conqueror had the choice of adding 
one extra glass of wine to his victory banquet (at a cost of a farthing)
29 or saving it for the benefit 
of his new realm (and its colonies). If someone
30
As a less extreme (non-monetary) example, consider a choice between conducting one 
hip operation today or six identical hip operations (at the same per unit cost) in 25 years time. 
Using an 8% social rate of time preference, the same decision-maker would favour the one hip 
operation today.
 were now given the choice of having 
NZ$70,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 (if King William had foregone the extra wine) or 
preferring that the king had imbibed the extra glass of wine, he would logically conclude that the 
extra glass was optimal.  
31
This comparison fully incorporates issues surrounding the funding of the operations (i.e. 
by debt and/or taxes). To see this, imagine that the government could choose between: (a) 
investing in equipment that produces one hip operation today, and (b) investment in an 
infrastructure project that yields a compound 7.9% p.a. real return over 25 years (that is 
reinvested at the same rate over time). Both choices cost the identical amount and are funded in 
exactly the same manner (i.e. the identical choices for both taxes and debt). In 25 years time, the 
infrastructure project is worth 6.2 times the amount of the initial investment; i.e. 6.2 times the 
cost of the hip operation today. Given that the two choices have the identical tax flow and debt 
structure as each other, the choice is between one hip operation today and six operations in 25 
years time; the 8% discount rate favours the former.  
  
   
                                                 
29 I.e. formerly one quarter of a penny, or approximately one-fifth of a New Zealand cent. 
30 I.e. someone who adheres to an 8% p.a. social rate of time preference. 
31 In related vein, Ken Caldeira of the Carnegie Institute is quoted in the Economist Magazine (5 December 2009) in 
relation to climate change: “If we already had energy and transportation systems that met our needs without using 
the atmosphere as a waste dump for our carbon-dioxide pollution, and I told you that you could be 2% richer, but 
all you had to do was acidify the oceans and risk killing off coral reefs and other marine ecosystems, risk melting the 
ice caps with rapid sea-level rise, shifting weather patterns so that food-growing regions might not be able to 
produce adequate amounts of food, and so on, would you take all the environmental risk, just to be 2% richer?” He 
has yet to find an affirmative answer! This example raises behavioural economics issues relating to lock-in and 
framing effects that are also important in decision-making but are beyond the scope of this paper. 48 
 
A1.3  Income Changes and Catastrophic Change 
Equation (A3) can be used to consider how one should handle the potential for income 
change over time (both absolute and relative to another country). It can also address potential 
catastrophic changes. For any of these cases, consider  ) ( ' 2 c u as the marginal utility of 
consumption in the (potentially distant) future, and calibrate r and ρ accordingly (in terms of 
return period). Then we can solve (A3) for r, treating this variable as the required return on the 
marginal investment project so as to give the optimal inter-generational consumption path for a 
given ρ (and given other exogenous parameters determining income). 
Ceteris paribus, if income and consumption are growing over time, then c2 > 1 c  and hence, 
with risk aversion,  ) ( ' 1 c u > ) ( ' 2 c u ; thus the left-hand-side of (A3) is “high” and we will require a 
“high” r (where “high” is interpreted relative to ρ). In other words, the marginal investment will 
need to have a “high” rate of return. The higher is the expected exogenous growth rate in the 
economy, the more that the optimal policy will curtail current investment relative to current 
consumption, by setting a high r for a given ρ. 
Consider the implications for potential catastrophic changes associated, for instance, with 
long-term effects of climate change or the risk of a major pandemic. These events may cause a 
substantial loss in future income and hence reduce c2 to very low levels; accordingly  ) ( ' 2 c u will 
be large and the left-hand-side of (A3) small. Recognising that there will now be a probability 
distribution over future outcomes, we can, to a first approximation, still solve (A3), in an 
expected value sense, for the optimal r. In addition, we would favour investment in projects that 
have returns which are negatively correlated with consumption outcomes as discussed in the 
irrigation example of section 6.      
Using the same framework (but for a nearer term time horizon), consider the 
implications for policy if the utility function is such that New Zealanders’ utility is dependent on 
the level of domestic consumption relative to the level in Australia, 
A c . The comparison to 
determine whether r should be “high” or “low” now comes down to whether 
A c c 2 2 / >
A c c 1 1 /  
and hence whether  ) / ( ' 1 1
A c c u > ) / ( ' 2 2
A c c u . If Australian income and consumption is growing 
fast, then the same logic as before demonstrates that the optimal r to adopt in New Zealand is 
low; i.e. the marginal investment will have a “low” rate of return. In this case, public policy will 
optimally set a low discount rate in order to boost the level of current investment. 49 
 
APPENDIX 2: Extension of Two-Sector Model to Include Infrastructure 
The long run equilibrium model in Grimes (2009b) is designed to mimic key features of a 
small open economy such as New Zealand that imports much of its capital stock. It has two 
sectors, traded (T) and non-traded (N), each with a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas 
production function using capital (K) and labour (L) as inputs, and with multi-factor productivity 
being determined by an exogenous constant (A). All capital in the economy is imported at world 
prices, while the economy’s total labour supply is given. The capital stock in each sector is 
chosen endogenously by profit-maximising firms; the same process allocates labour across the 
two sectors (with wages equated across sectors). Depreciation rates on capital are determined 
exogenously by technical conditions, and the real return on capital is set exogenously by world 
capital markets. Consumer demand for the two finished goods is determined via a constant 
elasticity of substitution utility function defined over traded and non-traded goods. Wage rates 
and non-traded goods prices are both determined endogenously so that non-traded consumption 
equals non-traded production while labour is fully employed. Imports of capital to satisfy 
depreciation requirements results in domestic production exceeding domestic consumption, with 
the current account of the balance of payments being zero. 
The baseline model had no role for government. In the current application, we introduce 
a government sector that invests in infrastructure (G) across each of the two sectors; the capital 
costs and depreciation associated with the infrastructure are financed through lump sum 
taxation. All government infrastructural capital is sourced from abroad. It is assumed to bear the 
same depreciation rate and cost of capital as private sector capital. 
To keep the model as similar as possible to the baseline model, we make only three 
modifications to that model. First, we model the productivity parameter in each production 
function (AN and AT for non-traded and traded sectors respectively) as a function of government 
infrastructure servicing each sector (GN and GT respectively). The production functions (A6 and 
A7 for non-traded and traded goods respectively) are identical to those in the baseline model; 
(A8) and (A9) provide the specifications for AN and AT where, for symmetry, we choose 
identical parameters across the two sectors. 
α α − =
1
N N N N L K A Y                 (A6) 
β β − =
1
T T T T L K A Y                 (A7) 
  ) exp(
2
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As in the original model, we assume that α=β=0.33. We set υ = -0.6, ω = 1 and ψ = -
0.4 with GN = GT = 1 initially, so that initial AN = AT = 1. With these parameters, for a given K 
and L, a 1% increase in G for a sector increases that sector’s production by 0.2%.
32
All other equations are as in the original study, except that income available to 
consumers is reduced by (r+d)*(GN+GT) corresponding to the lump sum tax required to service 
the infrastructure stock, where r is the cost of capital and d is the depreciation rate.  
 Larger 
increases bring smaller relative returns owing to the negative term in the quadratic in (A8) and 
(A9). 
The original model was simulated with consumption symmetry imposed; i.e. 
consumption of non-traded goods equalled consumption of traded goods. This assumption 
required production of traded goods to exceed production of non-traded goods; the extra traded 
goods production was required to meet the import of capital goods used in both sectors (with 
the imported amount equal to the capital depreciated in each period). Thus while consumption 
symmetry was imposed, the model did not include production symmetry. With consumption 
symmetry, the asymmetry in production in the current model is magnified since extra traded 
goods production is required to meet the import of (depreciated) infrastructure capital.  
We test the sensitivity of our results by adopting two different share parameters in the 
consumption function.
33
Under each version of the model, reported in section 7, we analyse the impacts of 
varying GN  and GT  individually by 1% (i.e. from 1.00 to 1.01) on the following variables: 
 In the first set of simulations, we set the consumption shares as equal (γ 
= 0.5) when GN = GT = 1; in the second set we set the share parameter so that production 
volumes in the non-traded and traded goods sectors are identical in the baseline simulation 
(γ=0.7317) when GN = GT = 1.  
YN    non-traded sector production; 
YT  traded sector production; 
Y  total production (=YN +YT ) ; 
C  total consumption (=CN +CT , where CN =YN ); and 
U  utility defined by the agents’ Cobb-Douglas utility function. 
                                                 
32 Note that with these parameters, the overall production function for each sector (i.e. incorporating G, K and L) 
has increasing returns across the three factors. The parameters in (A8) and (A9) can be varied to produce increasing, 
constant or decreasing returns across the three factors, but constant returns across all three factors can only be 
achieved where additional infrastructure, at the margin, has a negative impact on overall output. 
33 We assume that the consumption function is Cobb-Douglas; Grimes (2009b) also provides simulations with other 
CES specifications but finds similar results across different specifications. The CES parameter that varies across our 
simulations is the share parameter, γ. Motu Working Paper Series 
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